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Abstract Wemodel an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a
third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty about the state of the world. Candidates
receive signals on the state and propose a policy to implement. There are two classes of
voters: ideological, who are biased towards the policy proposed by the third candidate;
and non-ideological, who want the policy implemented to correspond to the state of
the world. We study two cases: (1) one in which the third candidate supports the most
popular policy (in terms of the electorate’s prior); (2) another one in which he sup-
ports the less popular policy.We obtain that the presence of a third candidate facilitates
equilibria in which the two mainstream politicians make informative announcements,
specially when the third candidate is biased towards the most popular policy. We also
obtain that many of the informative equilibria are sustained by a coalition govern-
ment, however the coalition is never between the two mainstream candidates. Last,
we observe that in equilibrium, the third inflexible candidate has significant chances
of winning office.
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1 Introduction
In systems with a representative democracy, the question of whether the electoral
process can aggregate the information the politicians have and transmit it to the voters
is of primary importance. Relevant contributions that date back to Harrington (1993),
Roemer (1994), Schultz (1995, 1996, 2002), andmore recentlyHeidhues andLagerlöf
(2003), Morelli andWeelden (2013), Loertscher (2012), and Kartik et al. (2015) agree
that in the presence of asymmetric information between voters and (better informed)
political parties, electoral processes may fail to be informative.1
This abundant literature on the policy distortions that arise when politicians have
superior information, has so far focused on the classic two-party competition model.2
However, in light of the recent results in the 2015 Spanish Municipal and Regional
Elections and the 2014 European Elections, this focus seems a bit narrow and unreal-
istic. In fact, the 2014 European Elections showed the erosion of majoritarian politics
and the irruption of third extremist parties all over Europe, from France (where Front
National won 25 % of votes), UK (where UKIP got the biggest share of votes) and
Spain (where Podemos, a party only 4 month old got an 8 % of votes), to Austria,
Denmark, Greece and Italy. More recently, the 2015 Spanish Municipal and Regional
Elections confirmed the end of our bipartisan system, giving Spain’s biggest cities,
Madrid and Barcelona, to extreme-left parties. A swift that also experienced other
important cities, say A Coruña, Cádiz, Valencia and Zaragoza.
Have nontraditional parties come to stay? According to a study conducted by Pew
Research in May 2015, the answer is yes. In fact, respondents of four out of six
European countries said that the rise of nontraditional political parties is a good thing.
This is the case in Germany, Italy, UK and Spain, where an overwhelmingly 70 % of
respondents answered that the rise of Podemos is good for the Spanish democracy.3
Based on the recent empirical evidence, we propose a model that studies the incen-
tives of twomainstream office-motivated politicians to reveal their private information
in the presence of a third ideological candidate and an electorate that is heterogeneous.
To this aim, we consider an adaptation of the model in Heidhues and Lagerlöf
(2003) (hereafter HL), in which two office-seeker candidates receive imperfect and
1 Adifferent view is that inMartinelli (2001) and Laslier and der Straeten (2004), who also analyze electoral
competition in the presence of asymmetries of information. The distinguishing feature of these papers is
that, in addition to parties, they also consider voters with private information about the policy-relevant
state variable. This assumption proves crucial to their results that transmission of private information is an
equilibrium in this case.
2 The only exception is Felgenhauer (2012), whose paper is discussed below.
3 The numbers for the other countries are: 66 % of respondents in UK (UKIP), 58 % in Italy (Five Star
Movement), and 50 % in Germany (Alternative for Germany). Only France and Poland showed more than
50 % of respondents thinking that the rise of nontraditional parties is a bad thing. See “Except in France
and Poland, Nontraditional Parties Viewed Positively”, May 29, 2015, Pew Research Center.
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correlated signals on the state of the world, which is unknown to voters.4 Following
their specification we consider a binary world, with two states and two possible poli-
cies. For expositional purposes, and inspired by the current EU economic crisis, we
identify the two policies as (1) an expansionary fiscal policy, that aims to stimulate
aggregated demand through public spending; and (2) a policy of austerity, that aims to
reduce budget deficits in order to foster the return of sustainable growth. Accordingly,
in our words, the state of the world will be either pro-stimulus or pro-austerity. We
assume that a policy consisting of expansionary measures or fiscal stimulus is the
best fit for the economy if the state is pro-stimulus, and that an austerity policy is the
appropriate one if the state is pro-austerity.5 Following HL, we assume that the two
mainstream candidates observe the signals and propose the policies so as to win office.
We extend the HL set-up in two directions. (1) First, we consider the existence
of a third candidate that runs for office. Based on casual observation, we assume
that the third candidate is ideological and always proposes the same policy (in our
case, the expansive fiscal policy). This is an assumption that aids considerably in the
tractability of the problem and is grounded in the real world observation that third
parties are usually more dogmatic than mainstream ones.6 Laver and Hunt (1992)
find strong evidence to support this idea. In a study for 25 countries, they asked
people to locate in a scale 1–20 the position of the most important parties in their
country regarding the following question: “forced to make a choice, would party
leaders give up policy objectives in order to get into government orwould they sacrifice
a place in government in order to maintain policy objectives?”. They observed that
systematically, citizens of different countries perceive mainstream candidates as more
willing to give up policy objectives (then, as more strategic) and third parties as more
likely to give up a place in government (then, as more deterministic).7 (2) Second, we
4 Heidhues and Lagerlöf (2003) analyze a model with two Downsian candidates. They show that because
Bayesian voters penalize the candidates that contradict the electorate’s priors, if the prior is biased in favor
of a policy, full revelation by the two candidates cannot occur. In this case, the most reasonable equilibrium
(Pareto superior) is the popular beliefs one.
5 Despite the introduction of a third candidate, we follow HL and consider an economy where the policy
decision is binary. The reason is twofold: first, the common formulation facilitates making comparisons
with HL. Second, it stays closer to the current debate within the EU about which strategy is best to return
economic growth.
6 Note that this assumption does not mean that the third candidate has no access to the superior information
that mainstream candidates have. It simply says that independently of what the information is and the third
candidate’s chances ofwinning office, his preferences or those of his party are such that he alwaysmaximizes
utility by proposing the expansive fiscal policy. In a sense, we model a third candidate that because of his
strong ideology, he ends up having his hands tied, and so losses all capacity and/or willingness to propose
and campaign on a policy that is not his preferred one. For example, because doing so could be interpreted
by party-affiliates as going against the core, the main-principles and the foundations of the party. See
Besley (2006) for models of information transmission and politics in which agents with access to private
information are not strategic players.
7 In the scale 1–20, value 1 corresponds toGive up place in government, and 20 toGive up policy objectives.
The mean scores for some parties and countries are: (1) Britain: 13.45 for Conservative Party, 11.48 for
Labor Party, and 7.21 for Scottish National Party; (2) France: 12.36 for Socialist Party and 8.13 forNational
Front; (3) Germany: 14.27 for Christian Democratic Union, 10.56 for Social Democratic Party and 5.53
for Greens; Spain: 13.8 for Socialist Party, 13 for Popular Coalition (now People’s Party), 4.8 for United
Left. See page 125 for the question and pages 135–316 for the data.
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consider the existence of heterogeneous voters, divided into two groups. A majority
consisting of non-ideological voters, who want the implemented policy to correctly
match the state of the world; and a minority of ideological voters, who have a fixed
preference for the policy that the third candidate stands for (the expansive fiscal policy).
Thus, our election game incorporates three candidates and two groups of voters.
Candidates observe a signal about the state of the world and propose a policy to
implemented if elected. Voters observe the policy proposals, update beliefs about
which policy is best (if they need to) and cast their vote. Because with three candi-
dates it could be that no politician wins an absolute majority of votes, we need to
define the government coalition formation game and the policy implemented by the
resulting government. In the paper we consider that there is a function that maps elec-
toral outcomes (vote shares) into a probability distribution over the set of government
outcomes (single-party governments and coalition governments). That is, for every
vector of vote shares, this function determines the probability that each possible gov-
ernment outcome occurs. We also assume that when a coalition government forms, a
lottery (between the policies proposed by the candidates in the coalition) yields the
final implemented policy. This is known to everyone and taken into account by the
voters when deciding their vote. After casting the votes, votes are counted and the
electoral outcome determined. A winner of the election results and the corresponding
policy is implemented. Candidates and voters receive their payoff.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to analyze whether in this new scenario
with a third inflexible candidate and a group of ideological voters, the two mainstream
candidates can credibly transmit their information to the voters through their choice of
policy platforms. Thus, we focus on fully revealing equilibria. This is our information
transmission game. Second, to analyze how Bayesian (non-ideological) voters decide
their vote in the presence of the new actors; namely a third inflexible candidate that
always proposes the expansive fiscal policy, and a group of ideological voters in favor
of this policy. This is our voting game.
We solve the game by backward induction. We start with the voting game. We
consider a platform profile that corresponds to a particular class of fully revealing
equilibria. Given the platform profile, we analyze the voters’ optimal voting behavior.
This allows us to obtain the vector of electoral outcomes or vote shares. Then, accord-
ing to a function, we can obtain the probability that each single-party government and
coalition government occurs. We obtain that, in equilibrium, all coalitions that receive
positive probability are politically-akin coalitions. That is, coalitions of candidates
that propose the same policy. Then, we go backwards and analyze whether the set of
government outcomes (that receive positive probability) allows for information trans-
mission from the two mainstream candidates. We obtain that the presence of a third
inflexible candidate might actually help ease the information transmission game. This
result is in line with Felgenhauer (2012), who in a simpler set-up with one voter and
a less sophisticated signal technology, obtains that a third uninformed candidate can
help restore efficiency.8 We also show that for the mainstream candidates to credibly
communicate their information to the voters, it is best that the third inflexible candidate
8 Felgenhauer (2012) neither analyzes the voting game nor characterizes the set of government outcomes
that can follow a particular platform profile.
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be biased towards the most popular policy (in terms of the electorate’s prior). That
is, that both ideological and non-ideological voters have the same (a-priori) like bias.
This adds a new insight to Felgenhauer (2012)’s conclusion about the informational
benefit of an inflexible third candidate, namely that as important as the existence of
a third candidate it is his bias. Last, we obtain that for the mainstream candidates to
honestly reveal their information, we need voters to have a strict preference for one of
these two candidates. That is, that whenever mainstream candidates propose the same
policy, voters always vote for the same candidate. Otherwise, that is if under indif-
ference they flip a coin, no information transmission can be achieved. In this sense,
voters’ captivity seems to be good.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 analyzes the voting game and Sect. 4 studies the information transmission
game. Then, Sect. 5 presents a discussion, where we examine the implications that the
two main features of the model: third candidate and heterogenous voters, have on the
results. Finally, Sect. 6 concludes.
2 The model
An election is to be held. There are three political candidates and two groups of
voters. There are two stages of the world, wE and wA. Throughout the paper, wE
refers to an economic situation where expansionary or fiscal stimulus policies are
required to return economic growth. We will say that in this case, the state is pro-
stimulus. On the other hand, wA refers to a situation where austerity measures are to
be implemented first if we want to foster long-run sustainable growth. Here, we say
that the state is pro-austerity. Let q be the prior probability that the state is wE , i.e.,
P(w = wE ) = q ∈ (0, 1).
The candidates: Candidates are labeled 1, 2 and 3. Candidates 1 and 2 are Downsian
and want to get into office. We refer to them as the mainstream candidates. Candidate
3 is considered to have a preferred policy that he always proposes. This assumption
is intended to capture the empirical observation that third parties are usually more
dogmatic than the mainstream ones. We refer to the third candidate as the ideological
or inflexible candidate.9
There are two policy alternatives E and A, where E stands for expansionary fiscal
policies and A for austerity measures. We assume E is the correct policy in state wE
and A is the correct one in statewA. Candidates 1 and 2 choosewhich policy to propose
so as to win office. Let xi ∈ {E, A} be the policy proposed by candidate i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Without loss of generality, we assume x3 = E . Rents from office are K .
The information structure of the candidates: Each candidate 1 and 2 receives a
signal s1, s2 ∈ {e, a}, on the state of theworld.10 Signals are correlated, withρ ∈ [0, 1)
9 In fact, though there are clear examples of mainstream candidates implementing policies that they used
to oppose to (for example market privatizations by Mitterand, tax increases by Reagan, and more recently,
cutbacks by Hollande and, in Spain, by Zapatero), there is not so clear evidence of third parties doing so.
10 This is the same as considering that all three candidates observe a signal on the state. The reason being
that the third candidate always proposes the exact same policy; hence, the receipt of a signal or not by the
candidate and the content of the signal is totally irrelevant.
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Table 1 Signal technology
P(s2 = j/w = w j ) P(s2 = k/w = w j ) 
P(s1 = j/w = w j ) (1 − ε)2 + ρε(1 − ε) (1 − ρ)ε(1 − ε) 1 − ε
P(s1 = k/w = w j ) (1 − ρ)ε(1 − ε) ε2 + ρε(1 − ε) ε
 1 − ε ε 1
being a measure of the degree of correlation between the signals. Hence, the higher
ρ, the greater the correlation. Additionally, signals are not perfectly informative about
the state of the world.With probability (1−ε), a candidate’s signal is equal to the state;
with probability ε he receives an incorrect signal. We assume ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Table 1
summarizes the signal technology.11
Upon receiving a signal, candidates choose the policy to campaign on and to imple-
ment if elected.
The voters: There are two groups of voters: a group of ideological voters and a group
of non-ideological voters. All voters in a group are identical. Non-ideological voters
want the policy to be appropriate to the state. The utility of a non-ideological voter,
denoted by 4, is U4(E, wE ) = U4(A, wA) = 1 and U4(E, wA) = U4(A, wE ) = 0.
Ideological voters always prefer fiscal stimulus policies to cutbacks and other stiff
austerity measures. The utility of an ideological voter, denoted by 5, isU5(E, wi ) = 1
and U5(A, wi ) = 0, for i ∈ {E, A}. Total mass of voters is equal to one. Let β
and 1 − β be the fraction of non-ideological and ideological voters, respectively. We
assume β ∈ ( 12 , 1), i.e., we consider a majority of non-ideological voters.12
The election: Voters observe the vector of proposed policies (x1, x2, x3) ∈ {E, A}3.
Then, voters update beliefs about which policy is best (if they need to) and cast their
vote.13 This determines the vector of vote shares v = (v1, v2, v3), where vi denotes
the fraction of votes of candidate i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, with v1 + v2 + v3 = 1.
Thewinner and the implemented policy:Let V = {(v1, v2, v3) ∈ [0, 1]3 | v1+v2+
v3 = 1} be the set of electoral outcomes (or vote shares), and let v be an element of this
set. Additionally, let G = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} be the set of government
outcomes (collection of all single-party governments and coalition governments), and
let g be an element of this set. Note that G does not include the grand coalition.14
Now we introduce a function f : V → G, that maps electoral outcomes into
government outcomes. More precisely, for each v ∈ V ,
11 The signal technology is the same as in HL.
12 Otherwise, there would be no transmission of information but candidates would bias their messages
towards policy E .
13 Note that ideological voters do not need to update beliefs, as they have a strict preference for policy E .
14 When no candidate has a strict majority of votes, every two-candidate coalition is a minimal winning
coalition. Based on this, we argue that if in a posterior stage, candidates were given the opportunity to
choose the number of partners in the coalition, they would never say 3. Note that in this case the rents from
office, K , would have to be divided in three pieces. According to this, in the paper we exclude the possibility
of the grand coalition.
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f (v) = (p{1}, p{2}, p{3}, p{1,2}, p{1,3}, p{2,3}
)




where component pg gives the probability that government outcome g ∈ G occurs.
Our formulation introduces one assumption: a strict majority of votes is required
to govern. Thus, given v ∈ V , our definition of f satisfies:
p{i} = 1 if vi > 1/2
p{1,2} + p{1,3} + p{2,3} = 1, with p{1,2}, p{1,3}, p{2,3} > 0 if max{v1, v2, v3} < 1/2
p{i, j} + p{i,k} = 1, with p{i, j}, p{i,k} > 0 if vi = 1/2, v j , vk > 0
p{i, j} = 1 if vi = v j = 1/2, vk = 0
with (i, j, k) ∈ {1, 2, 3}3, i = j = k.
Two important comments:
– When there is a candidate, say i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, that wins an absolutemajority of votes,
our formulation implies that this candidate governs alone. That is when vi > 1/2,
p{i} = 1; thus g = {i}. In this case, we say there is a single-party government.
Here, the policy implemented is the one proposed by the winning candidate i , that
is xi . Candidate i gets the entire rents K from holding office.
– When no candidate receives a strict majority of votes, our formulation considers
that any pair of candidates (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, 3}2 such that vi + v j > 1/2 can form a
coalition government.15 That is, voters assign positive probability to any pair (i, j)
that satisfies vi +v j > 1/2 to enter government. In this case, the final government
will necessarily be a coalition government.16 Because all coalitions are minimal,
we assume that a candidate in a coalition receives half of the rents K from holding
office.
Next, we define what the implemented policy will be in this case. To this, we
first have to define what the (expected) implemented policy of a coalition, say
g = {i, j}, will be. We denote by x{i, j} the expected implemented policy of this
coalition.
15 Note that when max{v1, v2, v3} < 1/2, any two candidates form a winning coalition, as vi + v j =
vi + (1 − vi − vk ) = 1 − vk > 1/2, for (i, j, k) ∈ {1, 2, 3}3. In the other two cases, the vector of vote
shares determines which two candidates form the winning coalition/s.
16 Note that our function f only depends on the vector of vote shares v and not on the candidates’ proposed
policies, nor on the candidates’ labels. In this sense, our formulation of f is as general as possible, as when
no candidate receives a strict majority of votes, it allows any coalition of two candidates that together receive
more than half of the votes to agree on the formation of a coalition government. Note also that in this case,
our formulation of f allows for any coalition being equally likely to form, or for some coalitions being
more likely to form than others. A particular case here would be to consider that the coalition between the
two mainstream candidates is extremely difficult to form. This possibility is allowed by our formulation. A
different approach would be to directly assume that not all coalitions are feasible; for example, by excluding
a coalition of two particular candidates or a coalition of candidates proposing different policies.We consider
it an alternative interesting approach that however would require the introduction of additional assumptions
that, in our view, could sometimes be difficult to justify.
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Given g = {i, j}, with (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, 3}2 and i = j , the expected implemented
policy x{i, j} ∈ {E, A} is assumed to be the result of a lottery between the policies
proposed by the candidates in the coalition, and probabilities that are strictly pos-
itive for each event. More precisely, given the vector of outcomes (xi , x j ), with
(xi , x j ) ∈ {E, A}2, policy x{i, j} is given by the lottery
(xi , x j ; pi , p j ) (1)
that yields policy xk with probability pk , with k ∈ {i, j}, (pi , p j ) ∈ (0, 1)2 and
pi + p j = 1.17
Now, because when max{v1, v2, v3} < 1/2 any pair of candidates (i, j), with
(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, 3}2, can form a coalition government, the expected implemented
policy in this case will be a compound lottery between the policies implemented by
the winning coalitions (with x{i, j} defined by the lottery above), and probabilities
that are strictly positive for each event. That is, given the vector of simple lotteries
(x{1,2}, x{1,3}, x{2,3}), the compound lottery
(x{1,2}, x{1,3}, x{2,3}; p{1,2}, p{1,3}, p{2,3}) (2)
is the risky alternative that yields the simple lottery x{i, j} with probability p{i, j},
with p{i, j} ∈ (0, 1), ∑{i, j} p{i, j} = 1 and {i, j} ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.18
Timing: The sequence of events is as follows. First, candidates receive a private signal
on the stage of the world and choose the policy to propose. Voters observe the policy
proposals, update beliefs about which policy is best (if they need to), and cast their
vote. Votes are counted and according to function f , the government outcome is
determined. It also determines the final implemented policy.
Candidates’ strategies: Note that for the ideological candidate, x3 = E . Hence,
we restrict notation to exclusively account for the behavior of the two mainstream
candidates. We define σ ji as the probability that candidate i ∈ {1, 2} proposes policy
E after observing signal j ∈ {e, a}, and σc = (σ e1 , σ a1 ; σ e2 , σ a2 ) as the vector of
strategies for the (mainstream) candidates. Henceforth, we refer to (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2
as a platform profile.
Voters’ strategies:We assume that all voters in a group use the same voting strategy,
which implicitly means that voters in each group can perfectly coordinate in their
voting strategies and choose a common strategy (that they will all follow) that is a best
response to the other group strategy. This is a simplifying assumption that is of much
help in our analysis. In fact, note that because with a continuum of voters no voter is
17 The probability of an event could reflect the bargaining power of the corresponding candidate, thus his
vote share. In the analysis we do not require of any specific formulation. All that we need is that the two
events of the lottery have strictly positive probability.
18 If there is a pair of candidates that does not form awinning coalition, that is, for some ∀(i, j) ∈ {1, 2, 3}2,
vi + v j < 1/2, the compound lottery would not include the simple lottery x{i, j} as an outcome of the
compound lottery.
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pivotal, any voter’s strategy would be a best response, so our voting game would be
multiplicity of Nash equilibria.19
Note that under this assumption, it is sufficient to define the following two strategies.
Let σ x1x24,i be the probability that each non-ideological voter votes for i ∈ {1, 2, 3},
after having observed the policy proposal (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2. Similarly, let σ x1x25,i be
the probability that each ideological voter votes for i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, after having observed
the policy proposal (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2. Additionally, let σ x1x2v = (σ x1x24 ; σ x1x25 ), with
σ
x1x2
4 = (σ x1x24,1 , σ x1x24,2 , σ x1x24,3 ) and σ x1x25 = (σ x1x25,1 , σ x1x25,2 , σ x1x25,3 ), denote the vector of
voting strategies for voters of groups 4 and 5, respectively.
Thus, for example, if σ x1x24 = (1/2, 1/2, 0) and σ x1x25 = (0, 0, 1), we have a
situation in which each non-ideological voter votes for each of the two mainstream
candidateswith probability 1/2, and each ideological voter votes for the third candidate
with probability one. Now, because the mass of non-ideological and ideological voters
is β and 1 − β, respectively, we have that in this case, the (expected) vector of vote
shares is v = ( 12β, 12β, 1 − β).20
The equilibria: We are interested in studying whether in the presence of a third
inflexible candidate, the two mainstream candidates can credibly communicate their
information to the voters through their choice of policy platforms. Thus, our analysis
focuses on equilibria with full revelation. In the following, we say that an equilibrium
is fully revealing if the twomainstream candidates perfectly signal their information at
all stages of the nature. Note that if we restrict our attention to this class of equilibria,
candidate i ∈ {1, 2} has two strategies: (1) a faithful strategy, defined by (σ ei , σ ai ) =
(1, 0), and (2) a reversed strategy, defined by (σ ei , σ
a
i ) = (0, 1). Hence, in the fully
revealing class of equilibrium we focus on, the vector of the candidates’ strategies is
σc ∈ {(1, 0; 1, 0), (1, 0; 0, 1), (0, 1; 1, 0), (0, 1; 0, 1)}.
The equilibrium concept that we use is perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Note that although ourmodel considers a one-stage election game, the fact that there
are three candidates and two groups of voters makes the analysis of the information
transmission game and the voting game a bit complex. Thus, in order to be clear
in the exposition of the analysis and the results, we take the following approach.
Using a backward induction argument, we analyze the election game in two steps:
(1) first, we study the voting game. That is, we analyze how a voter that observes the
candidates’ platform profile (x1, x2) and understands the mechanism that transforms
votes into government outcomes (function f ), casts her vote. We do this for any
platform profile coming from a fully revealing class of equilibrium. (2) Then, we go
19 Alternatively, this assumption can be understood as if voters were following the “voting recommenda-
tions” of a leader of each group, who dictates the vote of each agent with the purpose of maximize the
welfare of the group. This is the case in Morelli (2004), where there are three groups of voters and each
group has a leader, who makes “voting recommendations” that voters follow “if and only if such a recom-
mendation constitutes a best response to the recommendations made by the other party leaders”. That is, in
his perfect coordination environment, the voting recommendations of the parties’ leaders need to constitute
a Nash equilibrium.
20 Under the alternative interpretation that voters follow the “voting recommendations” of a leader (see
Morelli 2004), σ x1x24,i could also be interpreted as the partition of votes of non-ideological voters that the
leader of this group determines. Similarly for σ x1x25,i .
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backwards and analyze the information transmission game. That is, we investigate
whether the resulting government outcomes allow the two mainstream candidates to
fully reveal their information to the voters during the election campaign.
3 Voting
Consider the following example. Suppose an election campaign in which the two
mainstream candidates propose cutbacks and other stiff austerity measures and the
third candidate proposes an expansionaryfiscal policy.Which candidate/swould voters
vote for?
If the voter is ideological the answer is quite straightforward. Because she has a
strict preference for expansionary fiscal policies, it is a dominated strategy for her
to vote for any of the two mainstream candidates. Thus, let us suppose she (and all
the other ideological voters) votes for candidate 3. Now, what about non-ideological
voters?
To answer this question we first have to analyze how non-ideological voters would
change their belief about which policy is best, if they were able to learn the content of
the two candidates’ signals. Note that this is always the case in the fully revealing class
of equilibria we focus on. There are two cases: (1) the prior distribution of the state is
in favor of the expansionary fiscal policy (q > 1/2); and (2) the prior distribution of
the state is in favor of the austerity policy (q < 1/2).21
First, suppose q > 1/2. In this case, when a voter has no other information than
her prior, she thinks that policy E is the best. Now, let us consider that the voter knew
the content of the two signals. If both were in favor of policy E , the voter would be
reinforced in her opinion that policy E is the best.22 If one signal indicated e and the
other a, the content of the two signals would cancel out and the voter would still prefer
E , her prior.23 Lastly, suppose the two signals indicated a. Applying Bayes rule, we
obtain that P(w = wA | s1 = a, s2 = a) > P(w = wE | s1 = a, s2 = a) if and
only if (1− q)[(1− ε)2 + ρε(1− ε)] > q[ε2 + ρε(1− ε)], which can be rewritten as
q < q˜ = (1−ε)[1−ε(1−ρ)]1−2ε(1−ε)(1−ρ) . In order for the problem to be interesting, when analyzing
the case q > 1/2, we will assume that after two a signals, the voter changes her mind
and prefers A. This requires the prior probability that E is the best policy being not
too large, i.e., q ∈ ( 12 , q˜).24
21 There is a third case, that corresponds to the situation of a balanced prior (q = 1/2). Here, note that
after two e (a) signals, a non-ideological voter votes for E (A); and after two contradicting signals, any
voting behavior is permitted. This is, therefore, a situation where no popular belief exists, which alleviates
the pandering problem and makes information transmission easier to sustain. The results for this case will
appear as minor comments or footnotes in the text.
22 Applying Bayes rule we observe that P(w = wE | s1 = e, s2 = e) > P(w = wA | s1 = e, s2 = e)
if and only if q[(1 − ε)2 + ρε(1 − ε)] > (1 − q)[ε2 + ρε(1 − ε)], which always holds as ε < 1/2 and
q > 1/2.
23 By Bayes rule, P(w = wE | si = e, s j = a) > P(w = wA | si = e, s j = a), for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j ,
if and only if q(1 − ρ)ε(1 − ε) > (1 − q)(1 − ρ)ε(1 − ε), which always holds as q > 1/2.
24 The reader can easily check that q˜ > 12 if and only if ε <
1
2 , which is always the case. Hence, the region
q ∈ ( 12 , q˜) does exist.
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Analogously, if q < 1/2, a voter with no other information than her prior would
vote for policy A. Now, if the voter knew that at least one signal indicates a, she would
prefer A. Otherwise, we assume she changes her mind and prefers E . Similar to the
previous case, this requires the prior probability that A is the best policy being not too
large, i.e., q ∈ (1 − q˜, 12 ).
Assumption 1 (Not too large prior) q ∈ (1 − q˜, q˜), with q˜ = (1−ε)[1−ε(1−ρ)]1−2ε(1−ε)(1−ρ) .
Let qˆ = P(wE | s1, s2) be the (non-ideological) voters’ posterior belief that the
state is wE , conditional on candidates 1 and 2 observing signals s1 and s2, respec-
tively. Assumption 1 guarantees that, independently of which policy, E or A, the prior
distribution of the state is in favor of, a non-ideological voter may change her mind
and end up with a belief that differs from her initial one. That is, if q ∈ (1 − q˜, q˜), qˆ
has support in all the interval (0, 1). Additionally, note that the voter’s updated belief
may favor a policy that is not proposed by any of the candidates.25 In this case, we
assume that non-ideological voters are bound to vote for a candidate that supports
their non-preferred policy.
Let us now come back to the example. Remember we were considering a scenario
in which the two mainstream candidates are proposing austerity measures, this is
(x1, x2) = (A, A). Also, suppose we are in a situation in which the posterior belief on
the state of theworld is qˆ < 1/2.26 Finally, note thatwe consider that (non-ideological)
voters can coordinate their voting strategies and choose a common strategy (that they
will all follow) that is a best response to the other group strategy. In this case, which
candidate/s would non-ideological voters vote for?
Because qˆ < 1/2, voters believe that policy A is the best. In this case, it is natural
to think that non-ideological voters should vote for either one of the two mainstream
candidates, 1 or 2. In fact, if they all were to vote for 1, that is σ AA4 = (1, 0, 0),
the electoral outcome would be v = (β, 0, 1 − β). Since β > 1/2, the government
outcome would be g = {1} and the policy implemented A, in which case the utility
to each non-ideological voter would be 1 − qˆ . On the other hand, if they all were
to vote for candidate 3 (let us say with probability 1), the electoral outcome would
be v = (0, 0, 1), the government outcome g = {3} and the policy implemented E .
Because the utility to each non-ideological voter in this case would be qˆ and qˆ < 1/2,
the result follows.
Now, what about a mixed strategy in which each non-ideological voter were to
vote for each of the two mainstream candidates with probability 1/2? Is it an optimal
strategy? To answer this question, suppose σ AA4 = ( 12 , 12 , 0). Note that in this case,
v = ( 12β, 12β, 1 − β). Since β ∈ (1/2, 1), max{v1, v2, v3} < 1/2. That is, we are
in a situation in which any pair of two candidates can form a coalition. In this case,
25 Since x3 = E , this could only be the case if voters observe (x1, x2) = (E, E) and the posterior belief
is qˆ < 12 , i.e., the posterior advocates austerity measures. This occurs when either q > 1/2 and the two
candidates use a reversed strategy, or q < 1/2 and there is at least one candidate using a reversed strategy.
26 In a fully revealing equilibrium, this occurs when one of the following cases hold: (1) q > 1/2 and the
two candidates use a faithful strategy; (2) q < 1/2 and the two candidates use a faithful strategy; and (3)
q < 1/2, one candidate uses a faithful strategy and the other a reversed strategy.
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because all coalitions are possible, the implemented policy is given by the compound
lottery:
(
x{1,2}, x{1,3}, x{2,3}; p{1,2}, p{1,3}, p{2,3}
)
with p{i, j} ∈ (0, 1),∑{i, j} p{i, j} = 1 and {i, j} ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}; with outcome
x{1,2} being equal to policy A,27 and outcome x{i,3}, with i ∈ {1, 2}, being the simple
lottery:
(
A, E; pi , p3
)
with (pi , p3) ∈ (0, 1)2, pi + p3 = 1, and i ∈ {1, 2}.
Now, let us denote by EU4(x{i, j}) the expected utility to any non-ideological voter
when the policy implemented is the simple lottery x{i, j}. Then, the expected utility to










pi EU4(A) + p3EU4(E)
)





pi (1 − qˆ) + p3qˆ
)
.
Note that (pi (1 − qˆ) + p3qˆ) is a convex combination of (1 − qˆ) and qˆ . Also,
remember that if σ AA4,1 = 1, the payoff to each of these voters is 1 − qˆ . Then, since∀qˆ < 1/2, 1 − qˆ > qˆ , the payoff to each non-ideological voter if they all follow
σ AA4 = (1, 0, 0) is higher than her payoff if they all use σ AA4 = ( 12 , 12 , 0). Thus,
we can conclude that using a mixed strategy that gives no mainstream candidate an
absolute majority of votes is not a best common strategy for this group of voters.
From the analysis above we learn that in equilibrium, no pair of candidates propos-
ing different policies will get enough votes to form a coalition government. That is,
all possible winning coalitions are going to be politically-akin coalitions.28
Lemma1 characterizes the voters’ optimal voting strategies, given a platformprofile
and a posterior belief about the state of the world. To simplify the characterization,
we assume that ideological voters never vote for a candidate proposing policy A.29
Lemma 1 Consider a platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2. In the voting game, the
optimal voting behavior of the voters, σ ∗x1x2v , satisfies the following conditions:
27 Note that x{1,2} is the simple lottery (A, A; p1, p2).
28 Note that in the present paper, this result is driven by the voting behavior of non-ideological voters, and
not by the candidates’ preferences, that we do not need to specify.
29 Since voters use common strategies, this is a dominated strategy for this group of voters.
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1. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, E). For any qˆ ∈ (0, 1):
(a) (σ ∗EE4,1 , σ ∗EE4,2 , σ ∗EE4,3 ) ∈ [0, 1]3, is such that
∑
i={1,2,3} σ ∗EE4,i = 1,
(b) (σ ∗EE5,1 , σ ∗EE5,2 , σ ∗EE5,3 ) ∈ [0, 1]3, is such that
∑
i={1,2,3} σ ∗EE5,i = 1.
2. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, A).
(a) When qˆ < 1/2:
(i) (σ ∗E A4,1 , σ ∗E A4,2 , σ ∗E A4,3 ), is such that βσ ∗E A4,2 > β(σ ∗E A4,1 +σ ∗E A4,3 )+ (1−β),
(ii) (σ ∗E A5,1 , σ ∗E A5,2 , σ ∗E A5,3 ), is such that σ ∗E A5,2 = 0,
∑
i={1,3} σ ∗E A5,i = 1.
(b) When qˆ > 1/2:
(i) (σ ∗E A4,1 , σ ∗E A4,2 , σ ∗E A4,3 ), is such that either σ ∗E A4,2 > 0 and βσ ∗E A4,i + (1 −
β)σ ∗E A5,i > β(σ ∗E A4,2 + σ ∗E A4, j ) + (1− β)σ ∗E A5, j , for (i, j) ∈ {1, 3}2, i = j;
or σ ∗E A4,2 = 0 and
∑
i∈{1,3} σ ∗E A4,i = 1,
(ii) (σ ∗E A5,1 , σ ∗E A5,2 , σ ∗E A5,3 ), is such that σ ∗E A5,2 = 0,
∑
i={1,3} σ ∗E A5,i = 1.
3. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, E).
(a) When qˆ < 1/2:
(i) (σ ∗AE4,1 , σ ∗AE4,2 , σ ∗AE4,3 ), is such that βσ ∗AE4,1 > β(σ ∗AE4,2 +σ ∗AE4,3 )+ (1−β),
(ii) (σ ∗AE5,1 , σ ∗AE5,2 , σ ∗AE5,3 ), is such that σ ∗AE5,1 = 0,
∑
i={2,3} σ ∗AE5,i = 1.
(b) When qˆ > 1/2:
(i) (σ ∗AE4,1 , σ ∗AE4,2 , σ ∗AE4,3 ), is such that either σ ∗AE4,1 > 0 and βσ ∗AE4,i + (1 −
β)σ ∗AE5,i > β(σ ∗AE4,1 + σ ∗AE4, j ) + (1− β)σ ∗AE5, j , for (i, j) ∈ {2, 3}2, i = j;
or σ ∗AE4,1 = 0 and
∑
i={2,3} σ ∗AE4,i = 1,
(ii) (σ ∗AE5,1 , σ ∗AE5,2 , σ ∗AE5,3 ), is such that σ ∗AE5,1 = 0,
∑
i={2,3} σ ∗AE5,i = 1.
4. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, A).
(a) When qˆ < 1/2:
(i) (σ ∗AA4,1 , σ ∗AA4,2 , σ ∗AA4,3 ), is such that βσ ∗AA4,i > βσ ∗AA4, j +(1−β), for (i, j) ∈
{1, 2}2, i = j ,
(ii) (σ ∗AA5,1 , σ ∗AA5,2 , σ ∗AA5,3 ) = (0, 0, 1).
(b) When qˆ > 1/2:
(i) (σ ∗AA4,1 , σ ∗AA4,2 , σ ∗AA4,3 ) is such that βσ ∗AA4,3 + (1− β) > β(σ ∗AA4,1 + σ ∗AA4,2 ),
(ii) (σ ∗AA5,1 , σ ∗AA5,2 , σ ∗AA5,3 ) = (0, 0, 1).
Proof In the Appendix. unionsq
For each platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, and posterior qˆ ∈ (0, 1), let ∗x1x2v
be the set of the voters’ optimal voting strategies that satisfy conditions in Lemma 1.
Let σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ∗x1x2v be an element of this set.
Having characterized the voters’ optimal voting strategies for a platform profile
(x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2 and the posterior qˆ ∈ (0, 1), the next steep is to determine, for
each platform profile and posterior, what electoral outcomes v ∈ V will result and
then, given function f , what probability distribution over government outcomes we
will have. Thiswill allow us to determine, for each platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2,
what government outcomes (single-party governments and/or coalition governments)
will have strictly positive probability to form. Prior to this, we introduce a new defin-
ition.
Abusing a bit of notation, for each platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, we denote
byGx1x2 ⊆ G the set of government outcomes such that, for each gx1x2 ∈ Gx1x2 , there
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exists optimal strategies for the voters σ ∗x1x24 and σ
∗x1x2
5 that, given function f , result
in gx1x2 forming a government with (strictly) positive probability when the platform
profile (x1, x2) is proposed. This definition will be very useful in the analysis of the
next section.30
To clarify this concept, consider the example above, where (x1, x2) = (A, A) and
qˆ < 1/2. According to Lemma 1, in this case (v1, v2, v3) = (βσ ∗AA4,1 , βσ ∗AA4,2 , 1−β),
with βσ ∗AA4,i > βσ ∗AA4, j + (1− β), for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2, i = j . Thus, in the equilibrium
of the voting game, either v1 > 1/2 or v2 > 1/2 occurs. Now, from the definition
of function f , we know that if v1 > 1/2, then p{1} = 1, and if v2 > 1/2, then
p{2} = 1. As a consequence, GAA = {{1}, {2}}. That is, given the platform profile
(x1, x2) = (A, A), when qˆ < 1/2, there are two government outcomes that, a priori,
have (strictly) positive probability: one inwhich candidate 1 governs alone, gAA = {1},
and another one in which candidate 2 does it, gAA = {2}.
Next Corollary characterizes, for every platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, the set
Gx1x2 ⊆ G.31
Corollary 1 Given a platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, the set of voters’ optimal
voting strategies, ∗x1x2v , and the function f , the set Gx1x2 is:
1. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, E).
Then, ∀qˆ ∈ (0, 1),GEE = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
2. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, A).
(a) Then ∀qˆ < 1/2,GEA = {{2}},
(b) Then ∀qˆ > 1/2,GEA = {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}.
3. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, E).
(a) Then ∀qˆ < 1/2, then GAE = {{1}},
(b) Then ∀qˆ > 1/2,GAE = {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}.
3. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, A).
(a) Then ∀qˆ < 1/2, then GAA = {{1}, {2}},
(b) Then ∀qˆ > 1/2, then GAA = {{3}}.
Corollary 1 shows that in the equilibrium of the voting game, only the candi-
dates that propose the policies that, according to the posterior belief qˆ , are more
likely to match the state of the world, have chances of entering a government. Thus,
as already anticipated, no coalition of candidates proposing different policies will
ever form. Additionally, we observe that except for the case (x1, x2) = (E, E), the
two mainstream candidates will never get enough votes to form a winning coalition
together.
To have an intuition for the proof, consider (x1, x2) = (E, E). In this case, any
voting strategy for the voters constitute a best response. Then, anyv ∈ V is possible and
thus, any government outcome has strictly positive probability. Accordingly, GEE =
30 Given a platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, since Gx1x2 depends on the set of the voters’ optimal
voting strategies, ∗x1x2v , we will write Gx1x2 (∗x1x2v ) when it clarifies the analysis.
31 The characterization is done for q = 1/2. As for the case q = 1/2, the posterior on the state can be
either qˆ > 1/2, qˆ < 1/2 or qˆ = 1/2. Regarding the last case, an analogous argument to the one used in the
text shows that for any platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2,Gx1x2 = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
Hence, under this assumption, in equilibrium any coalition can form.
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{{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}. Now suppose (x1, x2) = (E, A) and qˆ < 1/2. In
this case, non-ideological voters prefer policy A. According to Lemma 1, any vector
of voting strategies σ E Av such that the resulting electoral outcome is v2 > v1 + v3
is optimal. Because in this case v2 > 1/2, applying function f , we have p{2} = 1;
thus GEA = {{2}}. Suppose now (x1, x2) = (E, A) and qˆ > 1/2. Here, voters agree
that the best policy is E . Then, any voting strategy σ E A4 that guarantees that policy
E is implemented with probability 1 is a best response. This occurs when the vector
of voting strategies σ E Av results in either vi > 1/2, for i ∈ {1, 3}; or v2 = 0 and
v1 = v3 = 1/2. Thus, GEA = {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}. Last, suppose (x1, x2) = (A, A).
When qˆ > 1/2, voters agree that the best policy is E . In this case, any vector of voting
strategies σ AAv that results in v3 > 1/2 is optimal. Then, G
AA = {{3}}.32
4 Information transmission
We now return to the question of whether the two mainstream candidates can credibly
communicate their information to the voters through their choice of policy platforms.
To this aim, we go backwards and analyze whether for a given platform profile
(x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, the optimal voting behavior and the resulting government out-
comes gx1x2 ⊆ Gx1x2 , allow to sustain platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2 as part of
a fully revealing equilibrium.
We restrict attention to fully revealing equilibria and differentiate two cases, accord-
ing to which state of the world the prior is in favor of.33
Like biases
Let us start considering the case in which politicians know that expansionary fiscal
policies are more popular with the electorate than cutbacks and other stiff austerity
measures. In terms of our analysis, this means P(wE ) = q > 1/2. Here, note that
non-ideological voters with no other information than their prior prefer policy E . Since
ideological voters are in our model biased towards policy E , we say we have in this
case a scenario with like biases.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, our results show that candidates can, in this sce-
nario, credibly communicate their information to the voters. More interestingly, we
obtain that the number of government outcomes that allows for full revelation is greater
here than in the case of opposing biases, which is analyzed next.34
How can it be that the number of equilibria in which the twomainstream candidates
behave honestly is higher when the electorate is homogeneous than when voters have
different points of view? To see the intuition for this result, first note that in both
scenarios, the mainstream candidates have an incentive to bias their message towards
32 The case (x1, x2) = (A, A) and qˆ < 1/2 is the situation discussed previously in the text. As for the
case (x1, x2) = (A, E), the reasoning is analogous to that when (x1, x2) = (E, A).
33 The analysis of this section is done for the cases in which the electorates’ prior is biased in favor of
one of the states. As for the case q = 1/2, after two contradicting signals, the posterior will be qˆ = 1/2,
which does not impose any restriction on the government composition. That is, if q = 1/2, information
transmission is easily attainable.
34 This case will refer to the situation in which the prior is in favor of policy A.
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the electorate’s preferred policy, as inHL.35 However, the presence of a third candidate
who dogmatically supports fiscal stimulus policies introduces a second effect, that
reduces the attractiveness of proposing E .36 In the case of like biases, this second
effect counterbalances the first one, hence facilitating equilibria in which the two
mainstream candidates behave honestly. In contrast, in the case of opposing biases,
the first and the second effects go in the same direction, therefore making information
transmission more difficult to hold.
Prior to the results, given a platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, we define ˆ∗x1x2v ⊂

∗x1x2
v as the set of voters’ optimal voting strategies that satisfy conditions (1)–(3) of
anonymity:
1. If when (x1, x2) = (E, A), p{1} = 1; then when (x1, x2) = (A, E), p{2} = 1.
2. If when (x1, x2) = (E, A), p{3} = 1, then when (x1, x2) = (A, E), p{3} = 1.
3. If when (x1, x2) = (E, A), p{1,3} = 1, then when (x1, x2) = (A, E), p{2,3} = 1.
Note that the conditions on ˆ∗x1x2v only restrict the voting behavior when the two
mainstream candidates support different policies (in which case, the voters’ preferred
policy is E). That is, when the non-ideological voters’ choice is between the inflex-
ible candidate and the mainstream candidate that proposes E . With respect to these
situations, we say that any σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v holds the anonymity condition, which
means that the identity of the mainstream politician (whether he is 1 or 2) does not
affect the voter’s optimal voting behavior. The result in the Proposition 1 considers
σ
∗x1x2
v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v , which allows us to simplify the analysis.37
Last, for i, j ∈ {e, a}, let us define Pi | j = P(s2 = i | s1 = j). Also, we will
write gx1x2(ˆ∗x1x2v ) = {g} when we want to refer to a situation in which given a
platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, and the set of the voters’ optimal voting strategies
ˆ
∗x1x2
v , applying f we obtain p{g} = 1, with g ∈ G. That is, given (x1, x2) ∈
{E, A}2, gx1x2(ˆ∗x1x2v ) = {g} is equivalent to p{g} = 1.
Proposition 1 (Like biases) Consider q ∈ ( 12 , q˜). A configuration (σ ∗c , σ ∗x1x2v ;
gx1x2(ˆ∗x1x2v ))(x1,x2)∈{E,A}2,σ ∗x1x2v ∈ˆ∗x1x2v constitutes a fully revealing equilibrium if
and only if:
(i) σ ∗c = (1, 0; 1, 0) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v is such that
either:
(a) gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {3}, gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {1}; or
(b) gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {3}, gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = {1}, gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {1, 3},
with Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e; or
(c) gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {3}, gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {2}; or
35 Given that signals are of the same quality, any voter observing two contradicting signals would cancel
out the content of the two signals and so, would vote for the candidate that proposes the policy the prior is
in favor of.
36 Any mainstream candidate proposing E has to take into account that some of the voters who prefer E
may elect the inflexible candidate.
37 Apart form Proposition 1, the restriction to σ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v will also be used in Proposition 4. The
rest of the results in the paper consider the unrestricted set ∗x1x2v .
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(d) gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {3}, gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = {2}, gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {2, 3},
with Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e; or
(ii) σ ∗c = (1, 0; 0, 1) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v is such that
gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {1}, gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = {3} and either:
(a) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {1}, gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = {3}; or
(b) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {3}, gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = {1}; or
(c) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {3}, gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = {1, 3}, Pe|e > 2Pa|e; or
(d) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {1, 3}, gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = {1, 3}; or
(e) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {1, 3}, gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = {1}, Pa|a > 2Pe|a; or
(iii) σ ∗c = (0, 1; 1, 0) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v is such that
gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = {2}, gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = {3} and either:
(a) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {2}, gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {3}; or
(b) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {3}, gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {2}; or
(c) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {3}, gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {2, 3}, Pe|e > 2Pa|e; or
(d) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {2, 3}, gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {2, 3}; or
(e) gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {2, 3}, gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = {2}, Pa|a > 2Pe|a; or
(iv) σ ∗c = (0, 1; 0, 1) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x2v is such that
gAA(ˆ∗AAv ) = gE A(ˆ∗E Av ) = gAE (ˆ∗AEv ) = gEE (ˆ∗EEv ) = {3}.
Proof In the Appendix. unionsq
Proposition 1 yields a number of comments. First and foremost, that the most
robust equilibria are the ones in which candidates use a faithful strategy (case (i)).
Nonetheless, these are the only equilibria in which the two mainstream candidates
have a chance of winning office (although not together in a coalition, as discussed
next). Apart from this scenario, one of the mainstream candidates (the one using the
reversed strategy) never gets elected, which is the reason why we can sustain these
equilibria. In this sense, the equilibria in (ii)–(iv) are more fragile than those in (i).
Let us therefore comment in more detail the results in (i). An important conclusion
is that for the mainstream candidates to use a faithful strategy, voters must penalize
any disagreement between the policies proposed by these two candidates. That is,
information transmission requires that the ideological candidate forms a single-party
government whenever the mainstream candidates announce different policies. But not
only this, we also obtain that one of the twomainstream candidates is always excluded
from the government. A direct implication of this result is that no coalition between the
two mainstream candidates can ever form.38 To have an intuition for this result, note
that when (x1, x2) = (A, A) and q̂ < 12 , we showed that non-ideological voters had
to vote for one of the mainstream candidates with probability one.39 We now observe
that for information transmission to occur, after observing (x1, x2) = (E, E), non-
ideological voters have to vote again, with probability one, for the same mainstream
38 Note that this also occurs for the other class of fully revealing equilibria.
39 To prevent an eventual coalition between the inflexible candidate (proposing E) and a mainstream
candidate (proposing A), where the implemented policy could differ from the non-ideological voters’
preferred policy, i.e. A.
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candidate. Otherwise, the candidate who previously received no votes would find it
profitable to deviate to E .
Thus, from the analysis we learn that information transmission requires of voters
having a strict preference for one of the two mainstream candidates, that they use
whenever are indifferent between them. Otherwise, that is if under indifference voters
flip a coin (thus they may swing from candidate 1 to 2 and viceversa), no information
transmission can be achieved.
There is a last remark to make. It refers to the effect of signal quality and the
correlation between signals on the probability that transmission of information occurs.
To this respect, we observe that Pi |i ≥ 2Pi | j is a necessary condition for some of the
government outcomes to sustain information transmission. Since Pi |i is increasing in
ρ and decreasing in ε, and Pi | j is decreasing in ρ and increasing in ε, we obtain that the
higher the correlation between the candidates’ signals (ρ) and the lower the signal’s
error (ε), the higher the number of government outcomes that sustain information
transmission. Corollary 2 formalizes this idea.
Corollary 2 The number of government outcomes that allow for information trans-
mission increases in:
(i) the correlation between the candidates’ signals,
(ii) the quality of the signals.
Proof From the signal technology described in Table 1, we obtain Pi |i = (1 − ε)2 +
ε2 + 2ρε(1 − ε) and Pi | j = 2(1 − ρ)ε(1 − ε). Since ∂Pi |i/∂ρ > 0, ∂Pi |i/∂ε =
2(2ε−1)(1−ρ) < 0, ∂Pi | j/∂ρ < 0 and ∂Pi | j/∂ε = 2(1−ρ)(1−2ε) > 0, the proof
follows. unionsq
Opposing biases
Let us now consider the case of non-ideological voters ex ante thinking that austerity
measures are more appropriate than expansionary fiscal policies to return sustainable
economic growth. In terms of our analysis, this means P(wE ) = q < 1/2. Because
ideological and non-ideological voters differ in this case in their (a priori) preferred
policy, we say we have here an scenario of opposing biases.
As alreadypointed out, our result here shows that having an electoratewith opposing
views does not facilitate information transmission, but instead makes it harder. We
base this conclusion on two facts. First, the number of equilibria in which candidates
can credibly communicate their information to voters is smaller than in the case of
like biases. The reason being that with opposing biases, the incentive to go for the
electorate’s prior (now A) is no longer counterbalanced, but even reinforced, by the
existence of a third inflexible candidate that dogmatically supports policy E . Second,
the equilibria in the present case are quite fragile, in that they always embed one
candidate losing the election (the one using a reversed strategy).40
Proposition 2 (Opposing biases) Consider q ∈ (1 − q˜, 12 ). A configuration (σ ∗c ,
σ
∗x1x2
v ; gx1x2(∗x1x2v ))(x1,x2)∈{E,A}2,σ ∗x1x2v ∈∗x1x2v constitutes a fully revealing equilib-
rium if and only if:
40 Similarly to cases (ii)–(iv) in Proposition 1.
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(i) σ ∗c = (1, 0; 0, 1) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v is such that
gAA(∗AAv ) = gAE (∗AEv ) = gE A(∗E Av ) = gEE (∗EEv ) = {1}; or
(ii) σ ∗c = (0, 1; 1, 0) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v is such that
gAA(∗AAv ) = gAE (∗AEv ) = gE A(∗E Av ) = gEE (∗EEv ) = {2}.
Proof In the Appendix. unionsq
The comparison between the results in Propositions 1 and 2 draws an important
conclusion. It is neither the fact that voters are homogeneous, nor even the existence
of an inflexible third politician, that facilitates credible transmission of information
by mainstream candidates. The crucial feature is the combination of both. That is,
having an inflexible third candidate that caters to the (ex-ante) most popular policy.
In this sense, our results suggest that for third candidates to help indeed restore the
informativeness of electoral processes, the electorate should be like biased.
5 Discussion
We now discuss how the two main assumptions in the model affect our results.
5.1 Two-candidate competition
We first relax the assumption of three candidates competing for office and analyze
a scenario with, exclusively, two office-motivated candidates. Note that in this case,
there is no room for coalitions, as winning office is simply a matter of getting more
votes than your opponent. Given (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, let σ x1x2v = (σ x1x24 ; σ x1x25 ), with
σ
x1x2
i = (σ x1x2i,1 , σ x1x2i,2 ) and i ∈ {4, 5} be the vector of voting strategies for voters 4
and 5 in this case.
As in the main body of the paper, we posit two scenarios: like biases and opposing
biases.41 Interestingly, our results now show that there is no information transmission
in the case of like biases, but that there is in the case of opposing biases. Note this is
in contrast to the results in the previous section, where the presence of an electorate
with a like bias facilitated equilibria in which the two mainstream candidates behaved
honestly. This means that the result in the present set-up follows much in line with the
stark intuition that heterogeneity of views within the voters reduces the incentives to
go for the electorate’s prior. In fact, this reason explains the next result.
Proposition 3 (Two-candidate election) Suppose q = 1/2. A configuration (σ ∗c ,
σ
∗x1x2
v )(x1,x2)∈{E,A}2 constitutes a fully revealing equilibrium if and only if q <
1/2, β = 1/2, σ ∗AEv = (1, 0; 0, 1), σ ∗E Av = (0, 1; 1, 0), σ ∗AAv = σ ∗EEv =
( 12 ,
1
2 ; 12 , 12 ) and either σ ∗c = (1, 0; 1, 0) or σ ∗c = (0, 1; 0, 1).
Proof In the Appendix. unionsq
41 As for the case q = 1/2, it can be shown that there is an equilibrium in which the two candidates use
a faithful strategy, i.e., σc = (1, 0; 1, 0). A necessary condition is required for this equilibrium to hold:
σ∗AE4,1 + σ∗E A4,2 = 1β , hence σ∗AE4,2 + σ∗E A4,1 = 2β−1β , which further requires β ≥ 1/2.
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Proposition 3 shows that with two candidates competing for office, the electoral
process can be informative, but only if voters have opposite views. Otherwise, the
incentive to go for the popular belief prevents any information flow (as in HL). Addi-
tionally, it also requires that ideological and non-ideological voters are equal in size,
and that when the two candidates choose the same platform, they share votes equally.
Under these conditions, our result shows that introducing heterogeneity between vot-
ers restores the possibility of an informative equilibrium in a two-candidate context,
thus breaking with HL’s result.
5.2 One type of voter
Let us now consider that voters are only of one type: non-ideological. That is, there
is an unanimous consensus in the electorate that the best policy is that fitting the state
of the world.
To be consistentwith themain body of the paper,we consider that the third candidate
is biased in favor of a policy of fiscal stimulus. Additionally, we assume q > 1/2, i.e.,
with no other information, voters think that expansionary fiscal policies are the most
appropriate ones to return economic growth.42
Proceeding as in the main body of the paper, we can analyze the voters’ optimal
voting strategy. Note that in this case the analysis is simpler, as non-ideological voters
no longer have to worry about what a second group of voters vote. We obtain the next
result:
Lemma 2 Consider a platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2. In the voting game with
one group of voters, the optimal voting behavior of the voters, σ ∗x1x24 , satisfies the
following conditions:
1. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, E). For any qˆ ∈ (0, 1), (σ ∗EE4,1 , σ ∗EE4,2 , σ ∗EE4,3 ) ∈ [0, 1]3,
is such that
∑
i={1,2,3} σ ∗EE4,i = 1.
2. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, A).
(a) When qˆ < 1/2, (σ ∗E A4,1 , σ ∗E A4,2 , σ ∗E A4,3 ), is such that σ ∗E A4,2 > σ ∗E A4,1 + σ ∗E A4,3 .
(b) When qˆ > 1/2, (σ ∗E A4,1 , σ ∗E A4,2 , σ ∗E A4,3 ), is such that either σ ∗E A4,2 > 0 and
σ ∗E A4,i > σ ∗E A4,2 + σ ∗E A4, j , for (i, j) ∈ {1, 3}2, i = j; or σ ∗E A4,2 = 0 and∑
i∈{1,3} σ ∗E A4,i = 1.
3. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, E).
(a) When qˆ < 1/2, (σ ∗AE4,1 , σ ∗AE4,2 , σ ∗AE4,3 ), is such that σ ∗AE4,1 > σ ∗AE4,2 + σ ∗AE4,3 .
(b) When qˆ > 1/2, (σ ∗AE4,1 , σ ∗AE4,2 , σ ∗AE4,3 ), is such that either σ ∗AE4,1 > 0 and
σ ∗AE4,i > σ ∗AE4,1 + σ ∗AE4, j , for (i, j) ∈ {2, 3}2, i = j; or σ ∗AE4,1 = 0 and∑
i={2,3} σ ∗AE4,i = 1.
4. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, A).
42 In the case q < 1/2, we predict no equilibrium with full revelation. The reason is that the incentive to
go for the electorates’ prior (now A) is not counterbalanced by the existence of a third dogmatic candidate
proposing that policy, but it is even reinforced by the fact that this candidate always proposes E .
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(a) When qˆ < 1/2, (σ ∗AA4,1 , σ ∗AA4,2 , σ ∗AA4,3 ), is such that either σ ∗AA4,3 > 0 and
σ ∗AA4,i > σ ∗AA4, j + σ ∗AA4,3 , for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2, i = j; or σ ∗AA4,3 = 0 and∑
i={1,2} σ ∗AE4,i = 1.
(b) When qˆ > 1/2, (σ ∗AA4,1 , σ ∗AA4,2 , σ ∗AA4,3 ) is such that σ ∗AA4,3 > σ ∗AA4,1 + σ ∗AA4,2 .
Analogously to the case with two groups of voters, for each platform profile
(x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, let ∗x1x24 be the set of the voters’ optimal voting strategies that
satisfy conditions in Lemma 1. Let σ ∗x1x24 ∈ ∗x1x24 be an element of this set. We next
write the electoral outcomes in terms of government outcomes.
Corollary 3 Given a platform profile (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, the set of voters’ optimal
voting strategies, ∗x1x24 , and the function f , in the game with one group of voters the
set Gx1x2 is:
1. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, E).
Then, ∀qˆ ∈ (0, 1),GEE = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
2. Consider (x1, x2) = (E, A).
(a) Then ∀qˆ < 1/2,GEA = {{2}},
(b) Then ∀qˆ > 1/2,GEA = {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}.
3. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, E).
(a) Then ∀qˆ < 1/2,GAE = {{1}},
(b) Then ∀qˆ > 1/2,GAE = {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}.
4. Consider (x1, x2) = (A, A).
(a) Then ∀qˆ < 1/2,GAA = {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}},
(b) Then ∀qˆ > 1/2,GAA = {{3}}.
A comparison between the scenario with two groups of voters (Lemma 1 and
Corollary 1) and the present case (Lemma 2 and Corollary 2), shows that because
in the current situation the non-ideological voters no longer have to worry about the
ideological ones, those cases in which the existence of the latter class of agents obliged
the former to carefully cast their vote, are now altered. We observe that this is the case
when qˆ < 1/2. Otherwise, all voters had a preference for the expansionary fiscal
policy, so whether there is one or two groups of voters is irrelevant for the results.
Additionally, we observe that for the number of groups of voters to make a difference,
we need that more than one candidate proposes the austerity policy. Otherwise, it
is clear which candidate should non-ideological voters vote for. This means that the
difference is to be found in the case (x1, x2) = (A, A) and qˆ < 1/2. Here, we obtain
that a coalition between the two mainstream candidates can now form. The reason is
that with no votes for the third candidate, any voters’ voting strategy such that σ AA4,2 = 0
is a best response. This is in contrast to the scenario with two groups of voters, where
the coalition between the two mainstream candidates was not possible.
Taking into account this new electoral outcome, we go backwards and analyze the
information transmission game.





4 ))(x1,x2)∈{E,A}2,σ ∗x1x24 ∈ˆ
∗x1x2
4
constitutes a fully revealing equilibrium if and only
if it satisfies one of the conditions (i)–(iv) of Proposition 1, or condition
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(v) σ ∗c = (1, 0; 1, 0) and for any (x1, x2) ∈ {E, A}2, σ ∗x1x2v ∈ ˆ∗x1x24 is such that
either:
(a) gE A(ˆ∗E A4 )={1, 3}, gAE (ˆ∗AE4 )={2, 3}, gAA(ˆ∗AA4 ) = {1, 2}, gEE (ˆ∗EE4 )= {3}; or
(b) gE A(ˆ∗E A4 ) = gAE (ˆ∗AE4 ) = {3}, gAA(ˆ∗AA4 ) = {1, 2}, gEE (ˆ∗EE4 ) ={1, 2}.
Proof In the Appendix. unionsq
We obtain that a scenario with just one group of voters facilitates information
transmission by the two mainstream candidates. The reason is that in addition to the
equilibria characterized in Proposition 1, we now have two new government con-
figurations that sustain honest behavior. Interestingly, we obtain that in these new
government configurations, mainstream candidates are better off (compared to the
benchmark scenario), while the third inflexible candidate is worst off. In fact, any
disagreement between the two mainstream candidates does no longer result in these
candidates being always excluded from office. We also observe that under this new
scenario, if the mainstream candidates happen to announce the same policy, they can
now form a coalition government.
6 Conclusion
It is little wonder that the past 2014 European Elections will be remembered as
the rejection election.43 Indeed, poll results all over Europe showed the end of the
seemingly settled two-party political system of the mid-20th century. From Britain to
Denmark, France, Italy or Spain, “the center-left and center-right groups that form
the core of national and European Union politics have seen their power eroded by the
rise of extremist parties very different from one another, united only by their rejection
of the way things are, both at home and at the European Union” (“As goes Greece, so
goes Europe?”, The New York Times, 28th May 2014).
The rise of third parties presents an unprecedented challenge tomainstreampolitical
parties and to society as a whole. What consequences will this threat have for the
economic model that will govern us in the near future is something that we will learn
in due course. Working within a small area of this topic, this paper presents results
that move towards showing the consequences that this threat can have on the resulting
electoral outcomes and the informativeness of the electoral processes.
In this work we argue that the presence of a third inflexible candidate might help
ease the information transmission game, specially, when all voters are biased in the
same direction and so there are no conflicting views in the electorate. This result, which
a priori may look a bit contradicting, is robust. We observe it when in a posterior stage
we consider the existence of only one group of voters, and obtain that the number
of government outcomes that sustain information transmission is greater here than in
the previous case. Another interesting result is that for the mainstream candidates to
honestly reveal their information, we need voters to have a strict preference for one
43 “If this was the rejection election, where does mainstream politics go?”, The Guardian, 28th May 2014.
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of these two candidates. That is, that whenever mainstream candidates propose the
same policy, voters always vote for the same candidate. Otherwise, that is if under
indifference they flip a coin, no information transmission can be achieved. In this
sense, voters’ captivity seems to be good.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof In the analysis that follows, we consider that ideological voters never vote for
a candidate proposing policy A. Next, we differentiate four cases:
(i) Consider (x1, x2) = (EE). In this case only expansionary fiscal policies are
being proposed, therefore the final policy will always be x = E . This means that
any voting strategy is optimal for voters. That is, the optimal strategies of the non-
ideological and ideological voters satisfy, respectively, (σ ∗EE4,1 , σ ∗EE4,2 , σ ∗EE4,3 ) ∈
[0, 1]3, such that∑i={1,2,3} σ ∗EE4,i = 1; and (σ ∗EE5,1 , σ ∗EE5,2 , σ ∗EE5,3 ) ∈ [0, 1]3, such
that
∑
i={1,2,3} σ ∗EE5,i = 1.
(ii) Consider (x1, x2) = (E A). In this case (σ ∗E A5,1 , σ ∗E A5,2 , σ ∗E A5,3 ) is such that σ ∗E A5,2 =
0, with
∑
i∈{1,3} σ ∗E A5,i = 1.
First, consider qˆ < 1/2. In this case, if non-ideological voters were to vote
for candidate 2 with probability 1, σ E A4,2 = 1, the electoral outcome would be
(v1, v2, v3) = ((1 − β)σ ∗E A5,1 , β, (1 − β)σ ∗E A5,3 ). Since β > 1/2, g = {2}, in
which case the payoff to each non-ideological voter would be 1 − qˆ . Now, if all
non-ideological voters where to vote in such a way that candidate 2 did not get
a strict majority of votes, their individual payoff would be smaller, as the policy
implemented by the resulting government would be E with positive probabil-
ity. Then, the optimal strategy of non-ideological voters, (σ ∗E A4,1 , σ ∗E A4,2 , σ ∗E A4,3 ),
satisfies βσ ∗E A4,2 > β(σ ∗E A4,1 + σ ∗E A4,3 ) + (1 − β).
Now, consider qˆ > 1/2. Here, if G ⊆ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}, the payoff to each non-
ideological voter would be qˆ, whereas it would be smaller otherwise.44 Hence,
non-ideological voters must prevent candidate 2 from entering the government.
This means that their voting strategy must satisfy that if neither candidate 1 nor
3 gets an absolute majority of votes, candidate 2 cannot form a government.
Mathematically, v2 + vi < 1/2, for i ∈ {1, 3}. But this is a contradic-
tion, as whenever max{v1, v2, v3} < 1/2, any pair of two candidates gets an
absolute majority of votes. Thus, the optimal strategy of non-ideological voters,
44 In these other cases candidate 2 would be in the government, in which case there would be a positive
probability that policy A were implemented.
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(σ ∗E A4,1 , σ ∗E A4,2 , σ ∗E A4,3 ), is such that either σ ∗E A4,2 > 0 and βσ ∗E A4,i +(1−β)σ ∗E A5,i >
β(σ ∗E A4,2 + σ ∗E A4, j ) + (1 − β)σ ∗E A5, j , for (i, j) ∈ {1, 3}2, i = j; or σ ∗E A4,2 = 0 and∑
i∈{1,3} σ ∗E A4,i = 1.
(iii) Consider (x1, x2) = (AE). In this case (σ ∗AE5,1 , σ ∗AE5,2 , σ ∗AE5,3 ), such that σ ∗AE5,1 =
0, with
∑
i∈{2,3} σ ∗AE5,i = 1. Now, analogously to the previous case, we obtain:
When qˆ < 1/2, (σ ∗AE4,1 , σ ∗AE4,2 , σ ∗AE4,3 ), such that βσ ∗AE4,1 > β(σ ∗AE4,2 + σ ∗AE4,3 ) +
(1 − β).
When qˆ > 1/2, (σ ∗AE4,1 , σ ∗AE4,2 , σ ∗AE4,3 ), such that either σ ∗AE4,1 > 0 and βσ ∗AE4,i +
(1 − β)σ ∗AE5,i > β(σ ∗AE4,1 + σ ∗AE4, j ) + (1 − β)σ ∗AE5, j , for (i, j) ∈ {2, 3}2, i = j;
or σ ∗AE4,1 = 0 and
∑
i∈{2,3} σ ∗AE4,i = 1.
(iv) Last, consider (x1, x2) = (AA). In this case (σ ∗AA5,1 , σ ∗AA5,2 , σ ∗AA5,3 ) = (0, 0, 1).
First, consider qˆ < 1/2. In this case, if non-ideological voters were to vote for
one of the two mainstream candidates (let us say candidate 1) with probability
1, σ AA4,1 = 1, the electoral outcome would be (v1, v2, v3) = (β, 0, 1 − β), the
government outcome g = {1}, and the payoff to each of these voters 1 − qˆ. In
contrast, if they all voted in such a way that candidate 1 (nor 2) no longer obtained
a majority of votes, their individual expected utility would be smaller, as policy
E would be implemented with positive probability. Then, the optimal strategy of
these voters, (σ ∗AA4,1 , σ ∗AA4,2 , σ ∗AA4,3 ), satisfies that either one of the twomainstream
candidates receive a strict majority of votes. This is, βσ ∗AA4,i > βσ ∗AA4, j + (1−β),
for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2}2, i = j .
Last, consider qˆ > 1/2. In this case, if non-ideological voters were to vote
for candidate 3 with probability 1, σ AA4,3 = 1, the electoral outcome would be
(v1, v2, v3) = (0, 0, 1), the government outcome g = {3}, and the payoff to each
of these voters qˆ . In contrast, if they all voted in such away that the third inflexible
candidate no longer obtained a majority of votes and one of the two mainstream
candidates were to enter the government, their individual expected utility would
be smaller, as policy A would be implemented with positive probability. Then,
the optimal strategy of these voters, (σ ∗AA4,1 , σ ∗AA4,2 , σ ∗AA4,3 ), satisfies βσ ∗AA4,3 +(1−
β) > β(σ ∗AA4,1 + σ ∗AA4,2 ). This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1:
Proof We have to analyze four cases:
(i) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 1, 0) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing E when having observed e must be a best response for





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}
0 if gE A = {3}
≥ Pa|e
{
K if gAA = {1}
0 if gAA = {2} (3)
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K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}





K if gAE = {2}
K/2 if gAE = {2, 3}
0 if gAE = {3}
≥ Pa|e
{
K if gAA = {2}
0 if gAA = {1} (4)
Analogously, choosing A when having observed a must be a best response for
candidates 1 (Eq. 5) and 2 (Eq. 6), respectively:
Pa|a
{
K if gAA = {1}




K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}




K if gAA = {2}




K if gAE = {2}
K/2 if gAE = {2, 3}





K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
(6)
Now, let us first suppose gE A = {1}. Then, we have gAE = {2}. In this case,
a necessary condition for (5) to hold is gAA = {1}, but then (6) cannot hold.
Similarly, let us suppose gE A = {1, 3}. Then, we have gAE = {2, 3}. Again,
gAA = {1} is necessary for (5) to hold, but then (6) cannot hold. Hence, this is
not an equilibrium.
Last, let us suppose gE A = {3}. Then, we have gAE = {3}. Here we have
two cases: (a) Consider gAA = {1}. A necessary condition for (6) to hold is
gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}, and a necessary condition for (3) to hold is either gEE ∈
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}} and Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e, or gEE = {1}. Note that if gEE ∈ {{1}, {1, 3}},
conditions (4) and (5) hold. Hence, if either gEE = {13} and Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e, or
gEE = {1}, there is an equilibrium in this case. (b) Analogously to the previous
case, there is an equilibrium in which gAA = {2} and either gEE = {2, 3} and
Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e, or gEE = {2}.
(ii) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing E when having observed e must be a best response
for candidate 1 (Eq. 7), and choosing A when having observed e must be a best





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}
≥ Pa|eK . (7)
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K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
(8)
Analogously, choosing A when having observed a must be a best response for
candidate 1 (Eq. 9), and choosing E when having observed a must be a best





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}






K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {2, 3}}
≥ 0 (10)
First, note that condition (10) always hold, and that a necessary condition for (8)
to hold is gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}.
Then, let us first consider gEE = {1}. In this case, a necessary condition for (9)
to hold is gE A = {3}, in which case (7) holds. Hence, there is an equilibrium in
this case.
Second, let us consider gEE = {3}. A necessary condition for (7) to hold is either
gE A = {1, 3} and Pe|e > 2Pa|e, or gE A = {1}. Note that in both cases condition
(9) holds. Hence, there is an equilibrium in this case.
Last, let us consider gEE = {1, 3}. Again, a necessary condition for (7) to hold
is either gE A = {1, 3} or gE A = {1}. (a) If gE A = {1}, a necessary condition
for (9) to hold is Pa|a > 2Pe|a . Hence, there is an equilibrium in this case. (b) If
gE A = {1, 3}, (9) always hold. Hence, there is an equilibrium in this case.
(iii) The case σc = (0, 1; 1, 0) is analogous to the previous one.
(iv) Last, suppose σc = (0, 1; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing A when having observed e must be a best response for





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}
(11)
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K if gAE = {2}
K/2 if gAE = {2, 3}





K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
(12)
For (11) and (12) to hold, a necessary condition is gE A = gAE = gEE = {3}.
Additionally, note that if (x1, x2) = (AA), the non-ideological voter thinks policy
E is the best one, then gAA = {3}. Hence, candidates 1 and 2 never get votes,
and so this is an equilibrium. This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof We have to analyze four cases:
(i) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 1, 0) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing E when having observed e must be a best response for





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}
≥ Pe|eK + Pa|e
{
K if gAA = {1}






K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
≥ Pe|eK + Pa|e
{
K if gAA = {2}
0 if gAA = {1}
(14)
A necessary condition for (13) to hold is gEE = {1}. But then (14) cannot hold.
Hence, this is not an equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing E when having observed e must be a best response for
candidate 1 (Eq. 15), and choosing A when having observed e must be a best





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}
≥ Pe|e
{
K if gAA = {1}
0 if gAA = {2} + Pa|eK (15)
Pa|e
{
K if gAA = {2}




K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
(16)
Analogously, choosing A when having observed a must be a best response for
candidate 1 (Eq. 17), and choosing E when having observed a must be a best
response for candidate 2 (Eq. 18):
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Pa|aK + Pe|a
{
K if gAA = {1}





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}






K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {2, 3}}
≥ Pa|a
{
K if gAA = {2}
0 if gAA = {1}
(18)
First, note that if gAA = {2}, condition (18) cannot hold. Hence, this is not an
equilibrium.
Now, consider gAA = {1}. A necessary condition for (16) to hold is gEE ∈
{{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}, and the necessary conditions for (15) to hold are gE A = gEE =
{1}. Note that in this case, both (17) and (18) hold. Hence, there is an equilibrium
in this case.
(iii) The case σc = (0, 1; 1, 0) is analogous to the previous one.
(iv) Last, suppose σc = (0, 1; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing E when having observed a must be a best response for





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}






K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
≥ Pa|aK (20)
For (19) to hold, a necessary condition is gEE = {1}. But then (20) cannot hold.
Hence, this is not an equilibrium. This completes the proof. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof We prove it in two steps: like biases and opposing biases.
1. Let us first consider the case of like biases, i.e. q > 12 . We have to analyze four
cases:
1.i) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 1, 0) is part of an equilibrium.
123
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Here, choosing A when having observed a must be a best response for candi-
dates 1 and 2:
Pa|a[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] ≥ Pa|a + Pe|a[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ]
Pa|a[βσ AA4,2 + (1 − β)σ AA5,2 ] ≥ Pa|a + Pe|a[βσ EE4,2 + (1 − β)σ EE5,2 ]
Adding inequalities we obtain 0 ≥ Pa|a + Pe|a = 1, which is impossible.
Hence, there is no equilibrium in this case.
1.ii) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
Here, choosing Awhenhavingobservedamust be a best response for candidate
1:
Pa|aβ + Pe|a[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] ≥ Pa|a[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ] + Pe|a
Analogously, choosing A when having observed e must be a best response for
candidate 2:
Pa|e[βσ AA4,2 + (1 − β)σ AA5,2 ] ≥ Pe|e[βσ EE4,2 + (1 − β)σ EE5,2 ] + Pa|e(1 − β)
Since, for i, j ∈ {E, A} and k ∈ {4, 5}, Pi | j = Pj |i and σ i ik,1 + σ i ik,2 = 1,
adding inequalities and rearranging, we obtain 0 ≥ Pa|a(1−β)+ Pe|a(1−β).
Since for i, j ∈ {E, A}, Pj |i + Pi |i = 1, there is no equilibrium in this case.
1.iii) The case σc = (0, 1; 1, 0) is analogous to the previous one.
1.iv) Last, suppose σc = (0, 1; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
Here, choosing A when having observed e must be a best response for any of
the two mainstream candidates, let us say, candidate 1. That is to say:
Pe|e[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] ≥ Pe|e + Pa|e[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ]
Since βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ≤ 1, there is no equilibrium in this case.
2. Let us now consider the case of opposing biases, i.e., q < 12 . Again, there are four
cases to analyze:
2.i) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 1, 0) is part of an equilibrium.
Here, choosing E when having observed e must be a best response for candi-
dates 1 and 2:
Pe|e[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ] + Pa|e(1 − β) ≥ Pe|eβ
+Pa|e[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] (21)
Pe|e[βσ EE4,2 + (1 − β)σ EE5,2 ]
+Pa|e(1 − β) ≥ Pe|eβ + Pa|e[βσ AA4,2 + (1 − β)σ AA5,2 ] (22)
Adding inequalities we obtain Pe|e(1− 2β) + Pa|e(1− 2β) ≥ 0 ⇔ β ≤ 1/2.
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Similarly, in equilibrium, choosing A when having observed a must be a best
response for candidates 1 and 2:
Pa|a[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] + Pe|aβ ≥ Pa|a(1 − β)
+Pe|a[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ] (23)
Pa|a[βσ AA4,2 + (1 − β)σ AA5,2 ] + Pe|aβ ≥ Pa|a(1 − β)
+Pe|a[βσ EE4,2 + (1 − β)σ EE5,2 ] (24)
Adding inequalities we obtain 0 ≥ Pa|a(1− 2β) + Pe|a(1− 2β) ⇔ β ≥ 1/2.
Hence, both requirements can only meet if β = 1/2. Now, if β = 1/2, and
taking into account that for k ∈ {4, 5} and i ∈ {E, A}, σ i ik,1 + σ i ik,2 = 1,
inequalities (21)–(24) can be rewritten as:
Pa|e(1 − σ AA4,1 − σ AA5,1 ) = Pe|e(1 − σ EE4,1 − σ EE5,1 )
Pa|a(1 − σ AA4,1 − σ AA5,1 ) = Pe|a(1 − σ EE4,1 − σ EE5,1 )
Now, since Pi |i > Pj |i , there is a unique solution for the system above, which
is σ AA4,1 = σ AA5,1 = σ EE4,1 = σ EE5,1 = 1/2. Hence, in this case, we have an
equilibrium.
2.ii) Suppose σc = (1, 0; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium. In this case, the payoffs
coincide with those in case 1.ii). Hence, this is not an equilibrium.
2.iii) Analogously, there is neither an equilibrium in the case σc = (0, 1; 1, 0).
2.iv) Last, suppose σc = (0, 1; 0, 1) is part of an equilibrium.
Here, choosing A when having observed e must be a best response for candi-
dates 1 and 2. That is to say:
Pe|e[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] + Pa|eβ ≥ Pe|e(1 − β)
+Pa|e[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ] (25)
Pe|e[βσ AA4,2 + (1 − β)σ AA5,2 ] + Pa|eβ ≥ Pe|e(1 − β)
+Pa|e[βσ EE4,2 + (1 − β)σ EE5,2 ] (26)
Adding inequalities we obtain 0 ≥ Pe|e(1− 2β) + Pa|e(1− 2β) ⇔ β ≥ 1/2.
Similarly, in equilibrium, choosing E when having observed a must be a best
response for candidates 1 and 2. That is to say:
Pa|a[βσ EE4,1 + (1 − β)σ EE5,1 ] + Pe|a(1 − β) ≥ Pa|aβ
+Pe|a[βσ AA4,1 + (1 − β)σ AA5,1 ] (27)
Pa|a[βσ EE4,2 + (1 − β)σ EE5,2 ] + Pe|a(1 − β) ≥ Pa|aβ
+Pe|a[βσ AA4,2 + (1 − β)σ AA5,2 ] (28)
123
SERIEs (2016) 7:307–339 337
Adding inequalities we obtain Pa|a(1− 2β) + Pe|a(1− 2β) ≥ 0 ⇔ β ≤ 1/2.
Hence, both requirements can only meet if β = 1/2. Now, if β = 1/2, and
taking into account that for k ∈ {4, 5} and i ∈ {E, A}, σ i ik,1 + σ i ik,2 = 1,
inequalities (25)–(28) can be rewritten as:
Pa|e(1 − σ EE4,1 − σ EE5,1 ) = Pe|e(1 − σ AA4,1 − σ AA5,1 )
Pa|a(1 − σ EE4,1 − σ EE5,1 ) = Pe|a(1 − σ AA4,1 − σ AA5,1 )
Now, since Pi |i > Pj |i , there is a unique solution for the system above, which
is σ AA4,1 = σ EE4,1 = σ AA5,1 = σ EE5,1 = 1/2. Hence, in this case, there is an
equilibrium of the type conjectured. unionsq
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof First, suppose an equilibrium inwhich either σc = (1, 0; 0, 1), σc = (1, 0; 0, 1)
or σc = (0, 1; 1, 0). In these cases, note that when the platforms profile observed is
(x1, x2) = (AA), applying Bayes’ rule we obtain qˆ > 1/2. Hence, gAA = {3}, as it
was the case in the analogous situations of Proposition 1. The analysis of these cases
are therefore identical to those in Proposition 1, thus omitted.
Let us now suppose σc = (1, 0; 1, 0) is part of an equilibrium.
In equilibrium, choosing E when having observed e must be a best response for





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}





K if gAA = {1}
K/2 if gAA = {1, 2}






K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}





K if gAE = {2}
K/2 if gAE = {2, 3}





K if gAA = {2}
K/2 if gAA = {1, 2}
0 if gAA = {1}
(30)
Analogously, choosing A when having observed a must be a best response for
candidates 1 (Eq. 31) and 2 (Eq. 32), respectively:
123





K if gAA = {1}
K/2 if gAA = {1, 2}





K if gE A = {1}
K/2 if gE A = {1, 3}





K if gEE = {1}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}






K if gAA = {2}
K/2 if gAA = {1, 2}





K if gAE = {2}
K/2 if gAE = {2, 3}





K if gEE = {2}
K/2 if gEE ∈ {{1, 2}, {2, 3}}
0 if gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}
(32)
Now, let us first suppose gE A = {1}. Then, we have gAE = {2}. In this case, a
necessary condition for (31) to hold is GAAF = {1}, but then (32) cannot hold.
Similarly, let us suppose gE A = {1, 3}. Then, we have gAE = {2, 3}. Now, gAA ∈
{{1}, {1, 2}} is necessary for (31) to hold. If gAA = {1}we are in the previous situation,
therefore no equilibrium exists. Let us consider gAA = {1, 2}. Then, a necessary
condition for (31) to hold is gEE ∈ {{2}, {3}, {2, 3}}, and a necessary condition for
(32) to hold is gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}. Note that if gEE = {3}, conditions (29) and
(30) hold. Hence, there is an equilibrium in this case.
Last, let us suppose gE A = {3}. Then, we have gAE = {3}. Here we have
three cases: (a) consider gAA = {1}. A necessary condition for (32) to hold is
gEE ∈ {{1}, {3}, {1, 3}}, and a necessary condition for (29) to hold is either gEE ∈
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}} and Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e, or gEE = {1}. Note that if gEE ∈ {{1}, {1, 3}},
conditions (30) and (31) hold. Hence, if either gEE = {1, 3} and Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e, or
gEE = {1}, there is an equilibrium of the type conjectured. (b) Analogously to the
previous case, there is an equilibrium in which gAA = {2} and either gEE = {2, 3} and
Pe|e ≥ 2Pa|e, or gEE = {2}. (c) Last, consider gAA = {1, 2}. A necessary condition
for (29) to hold is gEE ∈ {{1}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}}, and a necessary condition for (30) to
hold gEE ∈ {{2}, {1, 2}, {2, 3}}. Note that if gEE = {1, 2}, conditions (31) and (32)
hold. Hence, there is an equilibrium in this case. This completes the proof. unionsq
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